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The smooth operation of supply networks is crucial for the proper functioning of many systems,
ranging from biological organisms such as the human blood transport system or plant leaves to
man-made systems such as power grids or gas pipelines. Whereas the failure of single transmission
elements has been analysed thoroughly for power grids, the understanding of multiple failures is
becoming more and more important to prevent large scale outages with an increasing penetration
of renewable energy sources. In this publication, we examine the collective nature of the simulta-
neous failure of several transmission elements. In particular, we focus on the difference between
single transmission element failures and the collective failure of several elements. We demonstrate
that already for two concurrent failures, the simultaneous outage can lead to an inversion of the
direction of flow as compared to the two individual failures and find situations where additional
outages may be beneficial for the overall system. In addition to that, we introduce a quantifier that
performs very well in predicting if two outages act strongly collectively or may be treated as indi-
vidual failures mathematically. Finally, we extend on recent progress made on the understanding
of single link failures demonstrating that multiple link failures may be treated as superpositions of
multiple electrical dipoles for lattice-like networks with collective effects completely vanishing in the
continuum limit. Our results demonstrate that the simultaneous failure of multiple lines may lead
to unexpected effects that cannot be easily described using the theoretical framework for single link
failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The failure of links can impede the operation of supply
networks leading to potentially critical events; cascading
failures in power grids can cause power outages affecting
millions of households [1, 2] and embolism in humans and
plants may result in strokes [3, 4] or leaf death [5]. Such
events are typically caused by the failure of one or few
transportation links [2].
To prevent power outages caused by single link failures,
power transmission grid operators typically run the grids
N − 1 secure which means that a single failing transmis-
sion or generation element does not prevent stable oper-
ation of the power grid [6]. However, an increased risk of
extreme weather events caused by climate change raises
the risk several transmission elements failing thus leading
to power outages [7]. In addition to that, future power
systems with a high share of renewable energy sources
will have to transport power over long distances using
long transmission lines, thus also increasing the risk of
dependent link failures. For these reasons, grid opera-
tors are now encouraged to take specific dangerous N−2
contingencies into account [8] and an increase in corre-
lation between transmission outages, e.g. through more
extreme weather events, was recently associated with an
increased risk of cascading outages, raising the relative
contribution of multiple link failures to such cascades [9].
Many computational approaches towards studying and
classifying N − 2 outages have been developed in or-
∗ FK and JS contributed equally to this work.
der to study contingencies that result in additional over-
loads [10–13]. Nevertheless, such outages still lack a fun-
damental theoretical understanding. Basic mathematical
tools have been developed extending the concept of Line
Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs) originally used for
single link contingencies [6] to include multiple link fail-
ures thereby allowing for a mathematical description of
these contingencies [14–16]. These tools demonstrate
that the nature of multiple outages may be fundamen-
tally different from the outage of single lines, thus mak-
ing a direct transfer of understanding and intuition de-
veloped for single link failures [17] difficult. In particular,
multiple outages can enhance or attenuate each other in
a counterintuitive manner. Which topologies drive such
phenomena and which ones prevent them from happen-
ing is at present not fully understood.
In this article we analyse the collective nature of N−2
failures in linear flow networks, which describe different
systems including AC power grids in the DC approxima-
tion [6]. We demonstrate that two simultaneous failures
can cause a disturbance which strongly differs from the
sum of the disturbances induced by individual failures;
they can amplify or attenuate the flow changes in a grid.
In addition to that, we introduce a predictor which al-
lows us to understand under which circumstances these
collective effects play an important role and when they
can be neglected. We then apply the predictor to differ-
ent test grids and reveal its performance in forecasting
collective effects for multiple link failures quantitatively,
outperforming also distance measures proven to be good
predictors in the case of single link failures. Finally, we
extend on previous work [17] which successfully estab-
lished an analogy between flow rerouting after single link
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2failures and the fields of electromagnetic dipoles in reg-
ular grids, demonstrating that flows after multiple link
failures may be treated as an overlay of multiple individ-
ual dipole fields in such grids in the continuum limit.
II. LINK FAILURES IN LINEAR FLOW
NETWORKS
A. Fundamentals of linear flow networks
Linear flow networks describe the operation of various
types of systems including AC power grids [6, 18, 19], DC
electric circuits [20–22], hydraulic networks [23, 24] and
vascular networks of plants [25]. In such networks, the
flow Fm→n ∈ R over a link (m,n) is assumed to be linear
in the potential or pressure drop along this link
Fm→n = bmn(θm − θn). (1)
In this article, we focus on applications to AC power
grids, where Fm→n is the real power flow, θn ∈ R is
the voltage phase angle at node n and bmn ∈ R is pro-
portional to the link’s susceptance. We assume that the
susceptance is independent of the direction of the link
bmn = bnm and that it vanishes if no link (m,n) exists. In
this context, the linear description is commonly referred
to as the DC approximation due to its formal equivalence
with DC resistor networks [6, 18, 19]. This approxima-
tion is typically good for transmission grids with weak
link loading, see Ref. [18] for details. In hydraulic or vas-
cular networks, θn denotes the pressure at node n while
the transmission capacity bmn depends on the geometry
of a pipe or vein [23–25]. The flows are subject to the
continuity equation which means that at each node of the
grid the sum of the network flows must equal the inflow
to the grid;
N∑
n=1
Fm→n = Pm. (2)
The inflow Pm is positive if a current, power or fluid is
injected to the node and negative if it is withdrawn from
the grid.
Equations (1) and (2) fully describe the state and
the flow of the network once the link parameters bmn
and the injections Pm are given up to a constant phase
shift applied to all voltage phase angles. We intro-
duce a compact vectorial notation, summarising the
nodal potentials or voltage phase angles in the vector
θ = (θ1, . . . , θN )
> ∈ RN and the nodal injections in
the vector P = (P1, . . . , PN )
> ∈ RN . Here and in
the following sections, the superscript ‘>’ denotes the
transpose of a vector or matrix. We further label all
lines in the grid by l = 1, . . . ,M and fix an orientation
for each link. Summarising all link flows in the vector
F = (F1, . . . , FM )
> ∈ RM , Equation (1) reads as
F = BdI
>θ,
with the diagonal matrix of link strengths Bd =
diag(b1, b2, . . . , bM ) ∈ RM×M . Furthermore, we made
use of the node-edge incidence matrix I ∈ RN×M com-
monly used in graph theory. It establishes a correspon-
dence between the nodes in the graph and the edges con-
necting them and has the components [26]
In,` =
 1 if link ` starts at node n,−1 if link ` ends at node n,0 otherwise.
In the following, we use this matrix to assign an (arbi-
trary) orientation to each link in the network such that
Fm→n = −Fn→m. Using the node-edge incidence matrix
we can further rewrite the continuity equation (2) in the
compact form
P = IF = IBdI
>θ = Bθ. (3)
The matrix B = IBdI
> ∈ RN×N is commonly referred
to as the nodal susceptance matrix in power engineering.
Mathematically, B is a weighted Laplacian matrix [26,
27] with components
Bmn =

∑N
s=1
bns if m = n;
−bmn m 6= n.
(4)
For a connected network, this matrix has one zero eigen-
value λ1 = 0 with eigenvector v1 = 1 such thatB·v1 = 0.
For this reason, it is not invertible. However, the matrix
inverse appears naturally in many different contexts in-
volving the spreading of failures in networks. To be able
to nevertheless study these processes, one typically con-
siders the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse B† which has
properties similar to the actual inverse, see e.g. Ref. [28]
for details. We are now ready to extend the notation to
cover link failures as well, as covered in the next section.
B. Single and double link failures
Assume that a single link k in the network fails, thus
loosing its ability to carry any flow. Since the network
after the failure is still subject to the continuity equa-
tion (2), the failure will cause the flows on other links to
change to account for the remaining necessary transport.
Assume that the new flows are given as Fˆ = F + ∆F ,
where ∆F is the vector of flow changes, and fulfil the
continuity equation (3)
P = IˆFˆ
where Iˆ is the node-edge incidence matrix of the net-
work after removal of link k. In power engineering, the
changes of flows are typically captured in a matrix of
Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs) whose ele-
ment Ll,k describes the flow changes monitored on a link
l after another link k fails. Suppose that F
(0)
k is the flow
3on link k before the outage. In general, we will use the su-
perscript (0), i.e. round brackets, to indicate a flow before
an outage. Then the LODF is defined by its elements [6]
Ll,k :=
∆Fl
F
(0)
k
. (5)
Importantly, the LODF may also be expressed in purely
algebraic form using the (pseudo) inverse of the graph
Laplacian B [6]
Ll,k = bl
d>l B
†dk
1− bkd>kB†dk
. (6)
Here, we abbreviate the line susceptance bl1l2 of a link
l = (l1, l2) by bl. Furthermore, we defined a vector
dk ∈ ZN that characterises a link k = (r, s) and has
the entries +1 at position r, −1 at position s and zero
otherwise. Using the standard basis vectors in RN , this
vector may be written as dk = er − es. In power engi-
neering, the expression in the numerator is also referred
to as the Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) [6].
A PTDF between links l and k is calculated as
PTDFl,k = bld
>
l B
†dk
and describes the flow changes on link l upon a power
transfer from the one end of link k to the other one.
PTDFs are typically defined for power injections and
withdrawals at arbitrary nodes in the network [6]. In the
context of link failures, however, it is useful to restrict
them to power injection and withdrawal taking place at
the two ends of a link. For this reason, power injection
vectors dk have to correspond to the columns of the in-
cidence matrix in our setup such that dk = I · ek, where
ek ∈ RM is the vector with entry one at position of edge
k = (r, s) and zero otherwise.
On the other hand, the link failure may also be de-
scribed on the nodal level. If we collect all changes in
voltage phase angles after the failure of link k in the vec-
tor ψ = θˆ − θ, again denoting phase angles after the
failure by θˆ, a Poisson-like equation describing the out-
age in terms of the phase differences may be derived [17],
Bˆψ = F
(0)
k dk. (7)
Here, Bˆ is the Laplacian of the network after removal of
link k and F
(0)
k is the pre-outage flow on link k. This
equation was studied in the past in different settings [17,
29]. The failure of single links is thus comparably well
understood [17, 30, 31], whereas the simultaneous failure
of multiple links was not yet studied to the same extend
on a theoretical level.
For this reason, we now turn to the case of multiple link
failures and derive an expression for the flow changes on
the remaining lines in the grid. We will focus on the
case of two outages for now. Naively, we could just su-
perimpose the flow changes caused by the two individual
outages as described by Equation (5). Assuming that two
arbitrary lines o and k fail, this naive approach yields the
following expression for the flow changes on link l
∆F naivel = Ll,kF
(0)
k + Ll,oF
(0)
o (8)
However, this approach neglects the effect of the outage
of link k on link o and vice versa. To arrive at the correct
formula, we need to consider this interaction as follows;
the outage of link o changes the flow on link k by
F˜k = F
(0)
k + Lk,oF˜o.
An analogous expression holds for the effect of the outage
of link k on link o. Inserting these corrected flows into
Equation (8), we arrive at the following result for the flow
changes on link l [12]
∆Fl = Ll,kF˜k + Ll,oF˜o.
Finally, expanding this expression results in the follow-
ing equation encoding the collective flow changes in a
compact form
∆Fl = (Ll,o, Ll,k)
(
1 −Lo,k
−Lk,o 1
)−1(
F
(0)
o
F
(0)
k
)
. (9)
The resulting expression for ∆Fl is different from the
simple linear combination (8) due to the interaction of
the two failing lines o and k, which is encoded in the
matrix in the centre. More precisely, the collective effects
are governed by the LODFs of the interacting lines Lo,k
and Lk,o forming the off-diagonal elements of the matrix.
The inverse matrix in this formula may be calculated as(
1 −Lo,k
−Lk,o 1
)−1
=
1
1− Lo,kLk,o
(
1 Lo,k
Lk,o 1
)
.
Thus, the flow changes on a link l are given by
∆Fl =L(k, o) · (Ll,kF (0)k + Ll,oF (0)o
+ Ll,kLk,oF
(0)
o + Ll,oLo,kF
(0)
k ),
where L(k, o) = L(o, k) := 11−Lk,oLo,k is a symmetric
prefactor.
The equation describing flow changes after the fail-
ure of two lines thus differs from a naive overlay of the
two individual outages. In the following sections, we will
demonstrate in which cases these collective effects result-
ing from the interaction of both outages are important
and in which cases they may be neglected.
C. Elementary examples
In this section, we elucidate different elementary ex-
amples that describe possible interactions between the
individual outages and allow us to understand the role
played by collective effects in more detail.
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FIG. 1. Collective effects can amplify the flow changes after
N − 2 failures, thus increasing maximum link loading. The
node in the lower left corner (yellow) is assumed to be a pro-
ducer of one unit of power and the node in the upper right
corner (purple) a consumer of the same amount. All links
have a capacity of b = 1 and the numbers on the edges indi-
cate the (absolute) flow carried by the respective link with the
arrow pointing in the direction of positive flows. In addition
to that, the colour code ranging from black (no loading) to
yellow (maximal loading) indicates the loading of the links.
Bold face numbers indicate the link with the highest loading.
The naive overlay may be calculated by subtracting from the
flows observed in (b) and (c) the base indicated flows in a),
thus calculating the flow changes, and then adding the result
to a). This yields flows on the maximally loaded edge in d) of
|F naivemax | ≈ 0.5 + 0.125 + 0.07 = 0.72. Thus, the naive overlay
underestimates the flow on the maximally loaded edge in this
case.
1. Amplifying single outages
To start with, we present a case where the naive overlay
of two individual outages underestimates the collective
effects such that
|∆Fl|  |∆F naivel |
for some link l. An elementary example of a network
where this is happening is shown in Fig. 1 where the
topology is given by a network consisting of N = 9 nodes
and M = 12 links connecting them in a square grid.
This initial setup is shown in panel a). Panels b) and c)
show the flows flowing on each link (numbers on links)
after the failure of two different individual links (coloured
red). The bold number indicates the link with maximal
flow for the given setup. Each single outage leads to
a maximal flow on the top right link of |Fmax| = 0.57
and |Fmax| = 0.625 after the failure for panels b and c,
respectively. Naively, we would thus expect the failure of
both links to lead to a flow of
|F naivemax | = |∆F naivemax |+ |F (0)max| ≈ 0.125 + 0.07 + 0.5 = 0.72
by simply superposing the two individual outages. The
actual outage of both links, however, results in a much
higher flow on the link which reads as
|Fmax| = |∆Fmax|+ |F (0)max| = 1.0.
Whereas the two individual outages separately lead to a
moderate increase in flow on the link with the maximal
flow, their interaction results in a higher flow potentially
reaching the link limit. If the flow on all links would be
limited to, say, Flimit = 0.9, the naive overlay would thus
predict no overloading caused by the two link failures,
whereas in fact, the link loaded maximally in panel d)
breaks down in this case. This example demonstrates
that the results predicted by the theory of single link
failures may differ drastically from the correct calculation
taking into account the collective effects.
2. Effect of individual outages exceeding simultaneous
outage
In addition to the effect presented in the last section,
it may also happen that an additional outage is benefi-
cial for the maximally loaded link. A minimal example is
shown in Figure 2. In this setup, we have a unit inflow of
power at the centre left node (coloured yellow) P = +1
and a unit outflow at the bottom right node (coloured
purple) P = −1 whereas all other nodes neither consume
nor create power P = 0. The initial setup is shown in
panel a), where again (absolute) flows are indicated as
numbers on the edges as well as colour coded. Panels b)
and c) show the network after the single outage of two
different links (coloured red). The edge with the highest
absolute flow is indicated by a bold face number in both
cases. In panel b), we have |Fmax,b| = 0.6 whereas for
panel c) the maximum flow reads as |Fmax,c| = 0.52. The
situation after the simultaneous outage of both links is
shown in panel d). The edge with maximum flow now car-
ries an absolute flow of |Fmax,d| = 0.5, i.e. the collective
effects attenuate the flow on the edge with the highest
flow compared to each individual outage. This effect can
be seen as a realisation of Braess’ paradox [32, 33] since
the outage of an additional link is beneficial in terms of
the maximum absolute flow in the network for each indi-
vidual outage. Hence, cascades of failures may in some
situations be prevented by the intentional removal of a
second, carefully chosen link after a first transmission link
failure threatens stability [34, 35].
3. Sign inversion through double outages
In this section, we will discuss a highly surprising phe-
nomenon that appears in the case of multiple interacting
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FIG. 2. Collective effects can attenuate flow changes after
an N − 2 failure, thus making the contingency less severe.
Colour code of edges indicates the absolute flow on the link
going from blue for no flow to yellow for links with maximum
flow. The numbers on the links also represent the flow with
the arrows pointing in the direction of positive flow. (a) Initial
flow setup if there is a unit inflow at the yellow node on the
left and a unit outflow at the purple node on the bottom
right. (b) Flow setup after the failure of the top horizontal
link (red). (c) Flow setup after the failure of the central,
vertical link (red). (d) Flow setup after the failure of both
links. While the edge with maximum absolute flow after the
failure of the top link carries |Fmax,b| = 0.6 units (b) and the
maximum absolute flow after failure of the second link reads
as |Fmax,c| = 0.52 (c), this maximum after the failure of both
links reads as |Fmax,d| = 0.5. Thus, in both cases of individual
failures, the failure of an additional link would be beneficial
in terms of the maximal absolute flow in the network. This is
a realisation of Braess’s paradox.
outages; the collective effects may dominate in such a way
that purely collective effects can cancel (as shown in the
previous section) or even overcompensate the direct ef-
fects of individual link failures such that the flow changes
resulting from the failure of both links have a different
sign compared to the flow changes after each individual
failures.
To study this in more detail, we will use the following
notation in this section; suppose that links o and k fail
and flow changes are monitored on link l. Then we denote
by ∆F
[o]
l or ∆F
[k]
l the flow changes on link l when link
o or k fail, respectively. For the simultaneous outage of
both links o and k, we denote by ∆F
[o,k]
l the actual flow
change on link l. With this notation at hand, we will
construct examples where flow changes caused by indi-
vidual link failures ∆F
[o]
l and ∆F
[k]
l have the same sign,
but the collective flow change ∆F
[o,k]
l has the opposite
0.0
10.0
10.0
10
.0
20.0 10.5
9.510.0 10.5 1.0
0.5
0.5
a) 0.1
9.9
10.0
9.8
19.8 10.8
9.010.3 11.2 0.0
0.8
0.8
b)
3.3
13.3
19.9
16
.5
0.0 20.6
15.911.3 13.1 2.8
1.8
0.6
c) 3.7
13.7
20.3
17
.3
0.0 20.2
17.510.3 11.2 0.0
0.8
0.2
d)
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
FIG. 3. Collective effects can lead to a complete reversal of
the flow changes compared to individual outages. Colour code
on lines indicates the magnitude of flow going from blue for no
flow to yellow for maximal flow. Red indicates failing links.
(a) Initial flow setup with F
(0)
k = 20 F (0)o = 1. (b),(c) Flow
setup after individual failure of two links (o and k respectively,
marked red). In both cases, the flow on the top right link (l,
bold font) is greater than in the unperturbed grid; ∆F
[o]
l ≈
0.3, ∆F
[k]
l ≈ 0.1. (d) Flow setup after simultaneous failure of
both links. The flow on the top right link is smaller than in
the unperturbed grid. In fact, not only does the flow change
display a sign reversal, the total flow direction is reversed,
too; ∆F
[o,k]
l ≈ −0.7 < −F (0)l ≈ −0.5.
sign.
A small example of a network where such a situation
occurs is shown in Fig. 3. In the initial setup, there is
a small flow Fl = 0.5 on link l (a, bold face number).
For the failure of two individual links o and k shown in
panels b and c, respectively (red links), the flow on this
link is amplified thus showing positive flow changes in
both situations ∆F
[o]
l = 0.3 and ∆F
[k]
l = 0.1. However,
if both links fail simultaneously, the overall flow change
has the opposite sign ∆F
[o,k]
l = −0.7 thus even inverting
the direction of the flow Fl = −0.2 with respect to both,
the individual setup and the situation after the failure of
each individual link.
We will now explain this surprising phenomenon on a
theoretical level in more detail. For simplicity, let us as-
sume the flow changes due to the individual outages to be
positive and the flow change in the case of a simultaneous
outage to be negative,
∆F
[o,k]
l < 0, ∆F
[k]
l > 0, ∆F
[o]
l > 0. (10)
Plugging in Equation (9), we can cast these three condi-
6tions into the following form based on LODFs
1) Ll,oLo,kF
(0)
k + Ll,kLk,oF
(0)
o < −(Ll,kF (0)k + Ll,oF (0)o ),
2) Ll,kF
(0)
k > 0 and
3) Ll,oF
(0)
o > 0.
To study this condition in detail, we assume that both
the initial flows on the failing links and the LODFs be-
tween the failing links and the reference link are positive,
F
(0)
o , F
(0)
k , Ll,o, Ll,k > 0, without loss of generality – this
can always be accomplished by redefining the orientation
of one or both of the initial flows. We can then imme-
diately deduce that the mutual LODFs both need to be
negative Lo,k, Lk,o < 0 since they always have the same
sign (see Appendix A) and the left-hand-side is positive
if these LODFs are positive. Additionally, we do not
consider cases where both of the LODFs Lk,o and Lo,k
are equal to (minus) one keeping L(o, k) finite. For no-
tational convenience, let us now introduce positive con-
stants α and β defined by the following quotients;
α(o, k) = F
(0)
k /F
(0)
o > 0,
β(l, o, k) = Ll,k/Ll,o > 0.
We thus incorporated the whole dependence on the link
monitoring the flow changes l into the purely topolog-
ical constant β, whereas any dependence on the flows,
i.e. the specific power injections, are incorporated into
α. Dividing the first condition 1) by the right-hand-side,
we arrive at the following inequality
α(o, k)|Lo,k|+ β(l, o, k)|Lk,o|
1 + α(o, k)β(l, o, k)
> 1. (11)
In order for the inequality to be fulfilled, we thus need
a strong heterogeneity between α and β, i.e. the ratio
of initial flows on links k and o needs to differ strongly
from the ratio of their LODFs with respect to link l, and
we need mutual LODFs Lo,k and Lk,o that are large in
amount in order to reduce the size of the denominator
proportional to the product αβ compared to the numer-
ator. We will see in the next sections that strong mutual
LODFs also imply strong collective effects caused by the
simultaneous failure of links k and o.
Condition (11) can be simplified drastically if α  β
which may be realised e.g. through a very small initial
flow on link o compared to link k, such that F
(0)
o  F (0)k .
The above inequality then reduces to
α(o, k)|Lo,k|+ β(l, o, k)|Lk,o|
1 + α(o, k)β(l, o, k)
≈ |Lo,k|
β(l, o, k)
,
⇒Ll,o|Lo,k| > Ll,k.
We will now demonstrate how to design a network where
this inequality is satisfied. The construction works as
follows; we design a network topology where two links o
and k influence each other heavily (measured in terms
b)a)
FIG. 4. Two different network topologies are used to demon-
strate the performance of the predictor for collective effects.
a) Topology of the Scandinavian power grid extracted from
an aggregated version of the PyPSA-eur model [36] after the
removal of dead ends. The resulting topology has 260 nodes
and 361 edges. b) Topology of the IEEE test case 118 de-
signed for testing power flow algorithms [37]. The topology
has 118 nodes and 179 edges.
of LODFs), while a third link l is influenced very dif-
ferently by each of the links. Formally, Lo,k and Lk,o
both need to be comparatively large, while Ll,o and Ll,k
should be very different in size, thus leading to a small
value of β. In order to further construct an example of
flow sign reversal, we choose the power injections P such
that the flow on link k is much larger than the one on
link o such that α  β and such that ∆F [o]l > 0. The
resulting network conforms to the three conditions on the
flow changes given in the inequalities (10).
Indeed, we see that we can find networks where the in-
equalities are fulfilled as shown in Figure 3. The param-
eters in this case are given by α(o, k) = 20, β(l, o, k) ≈
0.03, Lo,k ≈ −0.19 and Lk,o ≈ −0.23. Inequality (11)
then holds and reads as
20 · 0.19 + 0.03 · 0.23
1 + 20 · 0.03 = 2.38 > 1.
As discussed previously, the mutual LODFs Lo,k and Lk,o
are both relatively large in this case which is indicative
of strong collective interactions as illustrated in the fol-
lowing sections. The purely collective effects not only
overshadow the individual outages’ effects on link l, in-
deed they reverse the total flow over the link.
III. COLLECTIVE EFFECTS IN COMPLEX
NETWORKS
As shown above, the impact of a double link failure is
not given by the simple sum of the individual outages’ ef-
fects, but strong collective effects may be present. Based
on the intuition developed in the last section, we will
introduce a quantifier in the following section that may
be used to identify in which situations collective effects
need to be taken into account and in which situations
7they may be neglected, thus being able to rely on results
obtained for single link failures. We will test this pre-
dictor on different test grids, mainly on the ones shown
in Figure 4; the Scandinavian power grid extracted from
the software package PyPSA-eur [36] (panel a) and the
IEEE test case 118 [37] (panel b).
A. Quantifying the strength of collective effects
To understand the purely collective effects of a simul-
taneous outage of two given links o and k, we first calcu-
late the difference between the real flow changes in case
of an outage of both links ∆F and the naive prediction
in terms of the sum of individual flow changes ∆F naive.
The difference calculated according to equation (9) and
equation (8), reads as
∆Fl −∆F naivel = L(o, k)
(
(Ll,o + Ll,kLk,o)Lo,k,
(Ll,k + Ll,oLo,k)Lk,o
)>(F (0)k
F
(0)
o
)
.
The overall prefactor L(o, k) is one if the product
Lo,kLk,o is zero and tends to infinity as the product ap-
proaches one. In order to write this expression more com-
pactly, we introduce the matrix Ξ : R2 → RM which has
the row vectors
Ξl = L(o, k)[(Ll,o + Ll,kLk,o)Lo,k, (Ll,k + Ll,oLo,k)Lk,o]
=: L(o, k)[Ξ(1)l , Ξ(2)l ].
This matrix includes the topological properties of the
rerouting problem and ignores the initial flows F
(0)
o and
F
(0)
k , which are determined by the specific power injec-
tions which may be time varying. The approach thus al-
lows quantify the impact of collective effects purely based
on the network topology. However, this comes at the
price of potentially missing situations with very unusual
flow patterns in which the approach presented here might
not be valid any more to predict collective effects. To get
an overall measure of the purely collective part of the
failure of two specific lines, we first take the `2-norm ‖·‖2
of each row. The resulting vector has the following entry
‖Ξl‖2 = L(o, k)
((
Ξ
(1)
l
)2
+
(
Ξ
(2)
l
)2)1/2
at position l.
Taking the `2-norm again leads to an overall expression
for the purely collective effects of the simultaneous outage
of links o and k which we summarise in a single collec-
tivity parameter ξ
ξ(o, k) := L(o, k)
(
M∑
l=1
[(
Ξ
(1)
l
)2
+
(
Ξ
(2)
l
)2])1/2
. (12)
Since interpreting the collectivity parameter ξ in this
form is rather cumbersome and we are looking for an eas-
ily accessible criterion that tells us which pairs of links in-
teract strongly, we further reduce this expression by mak-
ing a few approximations. Since the LODFs are bounded
by one, −1 ≤ La,b ≤ 1 for all links a, b, and are typi-
cally much smaller than one, in the order of O(10−3), we
expect terms of third order in LODFs to be negligible
against terms of second order such that we can on aver-
age neglect the former ones. In doing so, we arrive at the
following approximation for the collectivity parameter
ξ(o, k) ≈ L(o, k)
(
M∑
l=1
[
(Ll,oLo,k)
2
+ (Ll,kLk,o)
2
])1/2
= L(o, k)
(
(Lo,k)
2
M∑
l=1
(Ll,o)
2
+ (Lk,o)
2
M∑
l=1
(Ll,k)
2
)1/2
.
Summing over all links in a large network, Ll,o and Ll,k
will vary a lot and may thus essentially be treated as
random variables. Based on this observation we try to
further approximate the above expression. We expect the
collectivity parameter ξ(o, k) to be predicted by the two
non-varying quantities Lo,k and Lk,o characterising the
interaction between the two failing links. Since LODFs
are in general non-symmetric (see Appendix A), both
Lo,k and Lk,o need to be incorporated to successfully
predict the collectivity parameter ξ(o, k). In addition to
that, we expect the prefactor L(o, k) = (1− Lo,kLk,o)−1
to be well approximated by one in general, L(o, k) ≈ 1
since (absolute) LODFs are typically small.
Based on these considerations, we introduce a param-
eter that predicts the overall strength of collective effects
ξ and is defined as follows,
Λ(o, k) =
√
Lo,kLk,o. (13)
This predictor takes into account the relative effect of the
failing links o and k on one another. It is not only a good
predictor for the collectivity parameter ξ(o, k), but can
also be shown to bound it from below as summarised in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a connected network where
two links o and k with non-vanishing mutual LODFs
Lo,k, Lk,o 6= 0 fail. Then the collectivity parameter ξ(o, k)
as defined in Equation (12) is bounded from below by the
predictor Λ(o, k) =
√
Lo,kLk,o
ξ(o, k) ≥ Λ(o, k).
A proof is given in Appendix C. Note that the proof
makes use of the fact that Lo,o = −1 for all links o, but
we expect the statement to hold even without this as-
sumption. Figure 5 illustrates the performance of the
predictor in forecasting collective effects for the IEEE
test case 118 (panel a) and the Scandinavian power grid
(panel b) when averaging over all possible trigger links.
The predictor Λ(o, k) (abscissa) has a Pearson correlation
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FIG. 5. The predictor Λ(o, k) performs very well in forecasting the collectivity parameter ξ(o, k) for a link failure of two links
o and k. In both the IEEE test grid ‘case118’ (a) and the Scandinavian grid (b) the relationship between collectivity parameter
ξ(o, k) (ordinate) and predictor Λ(o, k) (abscissa) appears to be linear when plotted on a log-log scale. The slope of the curve
indicates a linear relationship on the normal scale as well. This implies a strong correlation between the two quantities as
implied also by a very large Pearson correlation coefficient of ρ = 0.998 in both cases indicating a linear relationship. The
histograms’ colour code indicates the relative frequency of data points in the given bin. Double logarithmic plots were used to
showcase the consistency of the scaling over many orders of magnitude. Note that binning was also done on a double logarithmic
basis, leading to much smaller bins for lower values of Λ and ξ.
coefficient with the collectivity parameter ξ (ordinate) of
ρ = 0.998 for both grids, thus indicating a linear rela-
tionship between the two quantities.
The predictor performs equally well if we replace the
Euclidean `2-norm in the definition of the collectivity pa-
rameter ξ in Equation (12) by other `p-norms. Norms
with p > 2 tend to emphasise large values much more
than smaller norms which is why we also tested the
p = 10-norm and even up to the p = ∞-norm, which
simply takes the maximum value. The predictor per-
forms very well in predicting collective effects also for
other test grids and norms as summarised in table I. For
all norms and all grids tested, we observe a very strong
correlation between predictor and collectivity parameter,
exceeding ρ = 0.9 in most cases. We discuss the predic-
tor and the different norms used to calculate it in more
detail in Appendix B.
To summarise, we find that two links show the
strongest collective interaction if their mutual LODF val-
ues are large, thus implying that a failure of one link has
a strong effect on the flow going over the other one and
vice versa.
B. Impact of network distance
Distance is known to play an important role for failure
spreading in power grids and other types of linear flow
networks [17, 30, 39, 40]. In this section, we will examine
if they may also be used to successfully predict collective
effects in multiple link failures. Typically, distances in
networks are measured between two nodes with the most
prominent distance measure being the geodesic distance.
It is given by the sum of the lengths or weights of all edges
test grid Pearson correlation ρ Λ(o, k) vs. ξ(o, k)
1-norm 2-norm 10-norm ∞-norm
case30 0.959 0.98 0.951 0.946
case118 0.947 0.984 0.972 0.97
scandinavia 0.909 0.964 0.968 0.967
pegase1354 0.933 0.974 0.967 0.966
Square grid 0.994 0.999 0.995 0.992
Sparse square grid 0.946 0.968 0.981 0.976
TABLE I. Pearson correlation ρ between predictor Λ(o, k) and
collectivity parameter ξ(o, k) in the case of a double outage of
links o and k for all possible pairs of inks o and k and different
test grids. Values are given for a number of test grids, namely
IEEE ’case30’, ’case118’ and ’pegase1354’ [37, 38] as well as
the Scandinavian grid and a periodic square grid with 20×20
nodes and another one with a share of s = 0.45 of its links
removed, and different norms used to calculate the collectivity
parameter ξ(o, k). While ξ(o, k) is predicted very well for all
norms, the 2-norm consistently yields the best results, albeit
by a small margin.
along a shortest path between the respective nodes,
dist
u/w
0 (v1, v2) = min
paths p(v1,v2)
∑
e∈p
`e,
where the superscript ‘u’ or ‘w’ denotes the unweighted or
weighted distance, the subscript ‘0’ describes the distance
in the initial graph before any kind of outage, v1 and v2
are the nodes whose distance is calculated, p(v1, v2) is a
path from v1 to v2 and `e is the length or weight of edge
e, which is set to unity when calculating unweighted dis-
tances. Additionally, one can define the geodesic distance
between edges as the smallest possible distance between
the nodes incident to the corresponding edges plus half
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FIG. 6. Distance performs moderately in predicting the overall collective effects of a double link failure of two links o and
k. In both the IEEE test grid ‘case118’ (a,b) and the Scandinavian grid (c,d) the collectivity parameter ξ(o, k) is plotted
against the unweighted rerouting distance edisture(o, k) (a,c) and unweighted geodesic distance edist
u
ge(o, k) (b,d), respectively.
The Kendall rank correlation τ is given in all cases. Although there is a clear trend towards smaller collectivity parameters for
larger distances, the correlation is much smaller than for the predictor Λ(o, k), thus indicating that effects other than distance
play an important role for collective effects as well.The histograms’ colour code indicates the relative frequency of data points
in the given bin. Logarithmic plots were used to resolve more details for very small values of the collectivity parameter. Note
that binning was also done on a logarithmic basis, leading to much smaller bins for lower values of ξ.
of each edge’s length,
edistu/wge [(r, s), (m,n)]
= min
v1∈{r,s},v2∈{m,n}
dist
u/w
0 (v1, v2) +
`(r,s) + `(m,n)
2
.
Here the subscript ‘ge’ denotes the geodesic distance
while (r, s) and (m,n) are the respective edges given by
the nodes they are incident on. As we demonstrated in
a recent publication [17], this distance measure does not
capture essential aspects of the flow rerouting after a link
failure. Instead, we proposed the rerouting distance
edistu/wre [(r, s), (m,n)],
given by the length of the shortest cycle crossing both
edges (r, s) and (m,n). If no such path exists, the rerout-
ing distance is defined to be ∞. This distance measure
is strongly correlated with the magnitude of the LODFs
as shown in Ref. [17].
Figure 6 shows the scaling of ξ with distance between
the failing links for a failure of two links. Here, we make
use of the Kendall rank correlation τ to quantify the
degree of correlation between the two quantities which
quantifies the rank correlation. This is due to the fact
that in contrast to the scaling observed with the pre-
dictor Λ(o, k) observed in the last section, we do no ob-
serve a linear scaling of the collectivity parameter ξ with
the different distance measures. The rerouting distance
performs slightly better in predicting the collectivity pa-
rameter ξ than the geodesic distance, where the former
one has a rank correlation of τ = −0.7 and τ = −0.62
with ξ and the latter one a correlation of τ = −0.66 and
τ = −0.51 in the test grid ’case118’ and the Scandinavian
grid, respectively. Thus both distance measures perform
moderately in predicting the collectivity parameter al-
though not nearly as well as the predictor introduced in
the last section. Still, the distance seems to be an im-
portant factor in determining the simultaneous outages’
effects – but contrary to the case of a single outage [17],
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other factors play an important role, too. We may thus
deduce that links that are closer to each other in both,
the rerouting distance and the simple edge distance tend
to have a stronger collective response. This behaviour
is expected given that the predictor performing best is
given by the product of the mutual LODFs between the
two failing links and the rerouting distance is known to
be a good predictor for the LODF [17].
IV. EXTENSION TO ARBITRARY LINK
FAILURES
Now that we analysed the simultaneous failure of two
links in detail, we will extend the theoretical framework
to more than two links failing. To this end, we will derive
a formula that describes this type of contingencies on a
nodal level and perform a continuum limit for valid for
infinitely large regular grids.
A. Derivation of generalized LODFs
Now consider the simultaneous outage of K links
{l1, ..., lK} with K < M . Then we define the projec-
tion matrix from the space of all links onto the subset of
failing links P : RM → RK via
Pkl = δl,lk ,
where δl,lk denotes the Kronecker delta. Consequently,
let D : RK → RN be the projection of the node-edge-
incidence matrix I : RM → RN onto the subset of failing
links which reads as
Dnk = (IP>)nk = In,lk , for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
With this definition the columns of this matrix are the
vectors dlk introduced in the definition of the LODF, as
per Eq. (6). As a reminder, they are defined by their en-
tries being +1 at the node corresponding to the start of
the respective failing link, −1 at the node corresponding
to the end of the failing link and 0 otherwise. Further-
more, we define the projected branch reactance matrix
Bout : RK → RK by
Bout = PBdP> = diag(bl1 , bl2 , . . . , blK ).
Using this matrix, we can also project the vector of all
initial flows onto the failing links defined by
F
(0)
out = PF (0) = BoutD>θ = (F (0)l1 F
(0)
l2
· · · F (0)lK )>.
The failure of multiple links may be regarded as a per-
turbation to the graph Laplacian B in the same way as
for a single link, see Ref. [17]
Bˆ = B + ∆B,
where Bˆ is the graph Laplacian after the failure of the K
links. The corresponding perturbation matrix ∆B may
then also be expressed using the projected node-edge-
incidence matrix as
∆B = −DBoutD>. (14)
In addition to that, the failure causes the nodal potentials
to change
θˆ = θ +ψ,
where ψ is a vector of the changes in angles. Using the
continuity equation (3) in the new grid
P = (θ +ψ)(B + ∆B),
subtracting from it the current balance for the old grid,
and applying the Moore-Penrose-pseudoinverse to the re-
sulting equation, the change in potential is calculated as
ψ = −(B + ∆B)†∆Bθ. (15)
We can simplify this expression by making use of the
Woodbury matrix identity [41] and arrive at the final
result
ψ = B†D(1K −P)−1F (0)out. (16)
Here, we defined a projection of the PTDF matrix onto
the subset of failing links P : RK → RK given by
P := BoutD
>B†D = P PTDF P>.
The change in phase angles may then be used to calculate
the flow changes by making use of Equation (1). The
vector of flow changes reads as
∆F = BdI
>B†D(1K −P)−1F (0)out. (17)
In principle, we may now make use of Eq. (17) to calcu-
late the flow changes after an arbitrary number of simul-
taneous contingencies. The immediate insight into the
structure of the contingency problem from this equation
is, however, limited. We will thus try to gain more insight
into the interplay of multiple outages by rearranging the
equation.
Starting with Equation (16) expressing the change of
voltage phase angles after the failure ψ, we can derive
the following Poisson-like equation similar to the case of
a single link failure as presented in Equation (7)
Bψ = DF (K), (18)
where we defined the vector of flows weighted by the
dipole source terms
F (K) := (1K −P)−1F (0)out.
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We may thus rewrite Equation (18) for the change in
nodal potentials as follows, making the correspondence
to the Poisson equation more apparent;
Bψ =
K∑
k=1
qk, (19)
with the dipole sources
qk = dkF
(K)
k
and the dk being the rows of D, see also section II B. In
addition to this expression, we can derive an analogous
equation for the graph Gˆ from which all the failing lines
have been removed. Simply plugging Equation (14) into
Equation (15), we arrive at the following equation
Bˆψ = DF
(0)
out.
We are thus left with a discrete Poisson equation with
potential ψ, which is analogous to the result obtained in
our previous work [17, sections III-IV] for a single fail-
ing link. Instead of a single dipole source this equation
is governed by K dipole sources. However, this equa-
tion differs from the naive approach obtained by simply
superposing single dipole sources. To see this, consider
the case of K = 2 link failures. As we have seen in the
last section III, collective effects play an important role
in the interaction of the two links. In this case, a simple
superposition of two dipoles results in the equation
Bψnaive = qnaive1 + q
naive
2 ,
where we defined the dipole sources resulting from the
naive approach
qnaive1 = d1(1−P11)−1F (0)out,1,
qnaive2 = d2(1−P22)−1F (0)out,2.
On the other hand, using the exact approach in Equa-
tion (19), the actual dipole sources read as
q1 = d1
(
[(12 −P)−1]11F (0)out,1 + [(12 −P)−1]12F (0)out,2
)
,
q2 = d2
(
[(12 −P)−1]21F (0)out,1 + (12 −P)−1]22F (0)out,2
)
.
The naive approach thus underestimates the interaction
between the two dipole sources encoded in the matrix
inverse (12 −P)−1. We discussed this interaction in de-
tail in Section III. In the following paragraph, we will
demonstrate, however, that this collective effect can be
neglected in the continuum limit, thus making the naive
superposition approach exact in that case.
B. Continuum limit for regular square lattice
We will now demonstrate how one may derive an ex-
act formula for the potential changes after an arbitrary
number of link failures for the setup of an infinite square
lattice extending on our previous work [17]. Consider
the elementary example of a regular square lattice em-
bedded in the plane R2. Label all nodes by their posi-
tions r = (x, y) and let the lattice spacing be denoted
by h. Now introduce continuous functions ψ and b such
that ψ(x, y) is the potential of the node at (x, y) and
b(x+ h/2, y) is the weight of the link connecting the two
nodes at (x, y) and (x + h, y) and analogously for two
nodes connected in y-direction.
For a small lattice spacing h → 0 and an infinitely
large grid, the left-hand side of the Poisson equation (19)
evaluated at position (x, y) can be written in a continuum
version as [17]
(Bψ)(x, y) = −h2∇(b(x, y)∇ψ) +O(h3). (20)
Then, the flow changes according to Equation (17) are
given by
∆F (x, y) = b(x, y)∇ψ(x, y),
where ∆F refers to the change in flow due to the link fail-
ures here and should not be confused with the continuous
Laplace operator.
The right-hand side of the Poisson equation (19) may
be calculated similarly noting that at most 2K nodes
contribute when K links fail. Let any failing link lk ∈
{l1, l2, . . . , lK} connect the nodes sk and tk with positions
(xsk , ysk) and (xtk , ytk) respectively. The discrete version
of a single addend on the right-hand side reads:
qk =
[
(1K −P)−1F (0)out
]
k
dk
= dk
K∑
i=1
[(1K −P)−1]kiF (0)out,i.
We will now show how this equation may be inter-
preted in the continuum version. First, the flow on a
failing link before the outage F
(0)
li
may be calculated as
F
(0)
li
=ˆ hF (0)(xsi , ysi) +O(h2),
where F (0)(xsi , ysi) = b(xsi , ysi)∇θ(xsi , ysi) is the con-
tinuum version of the flow before the outage. Second, the
vector dk can be formally interpreted in terms of the two-
dimensional delta function δ(x, y) and reads for a link lk
oriented in x-direction
dk =ˆ h∂xδ(x− xsk , y − ysk) +O(h2).
For links oriented in y-direction, we simply replace ∂x by
∂y. Finally, in order to calculate the continuum version
of the inverse matrix elements [(1K − P)−1]ki for two
arbitrarily chosen links lk and li, assume without loss of
generality that both links are oriented in x-direction and
that a continuum version b† of the Green’s function B†
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exists. Then, the elements of the projected PTDF matrix
may be calculated as
Pki = bkd
>
kB
†di
=ˆ h2b(xsk , ysk)
∫
∂yδ(x− xsk , y − ysk)b†(x, y)
∂xδ(x− xsi , y − ysi) dxdy
= δki
[
h2b(xsk , ysk)
∂2b†(xsk , ysk)
∂x∂y
+O(h3)
]
.
All off-diagonal entries are zero due to the delta func-
tions’ different arguments. Importantly, this observation
is independent of the orientation of the two links under
consideration. The inverted matrix is thus diagonal and
can be calculated as
[(1K −P)−1]ki =ˆ (1−Pki)−1 = (1−O(h2))−1
In total, we obtain after expanding the entire expres-
sion to lowest order in the continuum limit
qk(x, y) = h
2F (0)(xsi , ysi)
>∇δ(x− xsk , y − ysk) +O(h3).
(21)
We can now formally divide the left-hand side (20) and
the right-hand side (21) by h2 and take the limit h→ 0 to
obtain the final continuum limit of the Poisson equation,
∇(b(x, y)∇ψ) = −
M∑
k=1
q>k∇δ(x− xsk , y − ysk), (22)
where the source terms are qk(xsk , ysk) = F
(0)(xsk , ysk),
the unperturbed current field.
If the link weights are homogeneous, b(x, y) = b, the so-
lution is given by the superposition of K two-dimensional
dipole fields
ψ(r) =
K∑
k=1
qk(r − rk)
||r − rk||2 , (23)
∆F (r) = b ·
K∑
k=1
(
qk
||r − rk||2 − 2(r − rk)
qk · (r − rk)
||r − rk||4
)
.
(24)
We thus obtain a fully analytic solution in the contin-
uum limit. This solution reveals that in homogeneous
lattices the effects of multiple outages are given by the
superposition of single outages.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this article, we showed that multiple link failures can
lead to fundamentally different impacts than expected
from a naive superposition of single link failures. We
also established a parameter quantifying in which cases
these effects have to be taken into account. We extended
on previous work demonstrating that multiple link fail-
ures correspond to the overlay of correspondingly many
single dipoles in infinitely large regular grids, thus allow-
ing for a description similar to single link failures in this
case. However, the strength of the effective dipoles is
strongly determined by the collective effects, i.e. the in-
terplay of the failing links. Our results demonstrate that
further understanding of multiple link failures is an im-
portant task for the development and security of future
power systems, thus helping to understand in which cases
additional link shutdowns can help or counteract overall
system security.
In this work, we introduced several elementary exam-
ples which demonstrate the counterintuitive behaviour
of collective effects in some particular cases. We showed
that additional outages can be beneficial for the overall
grid loading, thus presenting another occurence of Braess’
paradox in power grids. On the other hand, we showed
that collective effects might lead to a sign inversion of
flow direction compared to the individual failure of each
single link. Both phenomena are potentially of high rele-
vance when operating power grids as they might help to
resolve situations where a single link fails or a redispatch
occurs. However, further work should be dedicated to
understanding and predicting these particular collective
effects on a more fundamental theoretical basis.
The predictor for collective flow changes introduced
in this manuscript allows for an easier understanding of
when collective effects on the flow changes become con-
siderably important. Mostly, collective effects seem to
be small, they only become relevant in cases where both
failing links have a strong effect on one another. This is
for example the case if the links are in close proximity
or if they are both bottlenecks. Conversely, this implies
that the intuition developed for single link failures may in
many cases also be applied to study multiple link failures
if the possibility of collective effects is kept in mind.
Distance between the two failing links seems to play an
important role for the overall collective effect. Previous
work has addressed the role of distance in flow changes
for single link failures where in particular the rerouting
distance was shown to be a decisive measure in predict-
ing the flow changes [17]. In predicting collective effects,
rerouting distance between the failing links still seems to
be an important quantity but not to the same degree as
it is important for single link failures. In the future, it
would be interesting to extend the rerouting distance to
more than two links which could potentially also predict
collective effects better.
Further work should address the role particular flow
patterns play in more detail. In the approach used here,
we abstract from individual flow patterns and focused
on topological aspects. This should be a good approxi-
mation for many cases, in particular when dealing with
large power grids. However, there might be cases in which
specific lines are nearly always more heavily loaded than
other ones which should imply a more important contri-
bution of such lines to collective effects.
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Appendix A: Symmetry of LODFs
The LODFs according to Eq. 6 are given by
LODFl,k = bl
d>l B
†dk
1− bkd>kB†dk
.
In this section, we will study the symmetry of this ma-
trix in terms of interchanging the role of failing link k and
link where flow changes are monitored l. This symmetry
describes the extend to which the flow change on one link
l due to another, failing link k corresponds to the oppo-
site flow change on link k if link l fails instead and thus
provides a measure of symmetry for the whole network.
In particular, we analyse how the matrix becomes asym-
metric with an increasing degree of asymmetry in the
links surrounding the monitored, and failing link. This
explains why both LODFs are important for predicting
the strength of collective effects in the predictor (13).
If we assume homogeneous edge weights for the time
being such that B = b · I, we notice that the numera-
tor in Eq. (6) is symmetric with respect to interchanging
l and k. This numerator is also referred to as Power
Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) in power engineer-
ing [6]. The symmetry can be seen by taking the matrix
transpose of the expression
(d>l B
†dk)> = d>k (B
†)>dl = d>kB
†dl.
On the other hand, the denominator is non-symmetric
even in the case that line susceptances are uniform, as it
reads as 1 − b · dtkB†dk for LODFl,k and 1 − b · dtlB†dl
for LODFk,l thus encoding the importance of the link
that fails. The LODFs are only completely symmetric
if both links have not only the same weights, but also
the same topological structure around them. This is for
example the case for the periodic square grid, see Fig. 7,
dark blue dots corresponding to s = 0 in the legend. We
analysed this expression in detail in our previous publi-
cation [17] and showed that it can be predicted using the
minimum cut that disconnects the two vertices k1 and
k2. In the case of uniformly distributed line susceptances,
this expression simply reduces to the well-studied resis-
tance distance [42, 43]. Thus, the asymmetry in LODFs
is encoded in both, the asymmetry in connectivity in the
network, i.e. the variance in the node degree, and the
asymmetry in the line susceptances.
In addition to the observation made before, we can no-
tice that the mutual LODFs Ll,k and Lk,l will always
have the same sign. This is due to the fact that as dis-
cussed above, the numerator is the same for both ex-
pression. On the other hand, the denominator is always
positive or equal to zero
1− bkd>kB†dk ≥ 0.
Whereas this is not obvious from the above expression,
it follows from the definition of the PTDFs given by
bkd
>
kB
†dk = PTDFk,k ∈ [−1, 1] [6]. Therefore we may
conclude that mutual LODFs always have the same sign.
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FIG. 7. With increasing degree of sparsity s in square grids, the LODFs become less symmetric. a) Whereas we observe
fully symmetric LODFs in a periodic square grid without any edges removed s = 0, removing edges increases the degreee
of asymmetry continuously up to s = 0.45. This is due to the fact that the entries of the inverse Laplacian B† become
increasingly heterogeneous with more edges removed. b) The degree of asymmetry in LODFs induced by increased sparsity in
periodic square grids also influences the performance of the predictor for collective effects Λ(o, k); it performs almost perfectly
for a periodic square grid with no links removed and homogeneous edge weights, where also LODFs are perfectly symmetric.
With increasing degree of sparsity, the performance reduces slightly, see also table I. For very high values of the predictor, the
prefactor L(o, k) dominates leading to the change from a linear scaling to a non-linear scaling for these values.
In Figure 7, we demonstrate how asymmetry in LODFs
arises with an increasing degree in inhomogeneity in the
nodal degrees for a periodic square lattice from which we
randomly remove an fraction s of its total number of links
according to the procedure described in Ref. [17]. In this
figure, we plot the LODFl,k against the LODFk,l for all
possible combinations of links l and k. Starting at s = 0
for a perfect periodic square lattice with 50 × 50 nodes,
the LODF is perfectly symmetric (dark blue dots). With
increasing degree of sparsity s ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45}
(dots from dark blue to light blue), we observe an in-
creasing spread of the LODFs indicating an increasing
degree of asymmetry in the LODFs.
Appendix B: A predictor for collective effects
To support the choice of the predictor for collective
effects, consider Figure 8(a,b). We show the predictor
Λ(o, k) and the remaining term, referred to as ’other
term’ in the figure, for all possible combinations of trigger
links for the test case ’pegase1354’ [38]. The remaining
term is constructed by factoring out the predictor Λ(o, k)
defined in Eq. 13 of the collectivity parameter ξ(o, k) in
Eq. 12 and assuming both LODFs Lk,o and Lo,k to be
non-zero
ξ(o, k) = Λ(o, k)·
L(o, k)
(
M∑
l=1
(
Ll,o sign(Lo,k)
√
Lo,k
Lk,o
+ Ll,k
√
Lk,oLo,k
)2
+
(
Ll,k sign(Lk,o)
√
Lk,o
Lo,k
+ Ll,o
√
Lk,oLo,k
)2)1/2
.
Applying the approximations discussed in section III to
this equation, this expression reduces to the following
equation,
ξ(o, k) ≈ Λ(o, k)
(
Lo,k
Lk,o
M∑
l=1
(Ll,o)
2
+
Lk,o
Lo,k
M∑
l=1
(Ll,k)
2
)1/2
.
Based on this expression, we discuss certain limiting cases
which explain the performance of the predictor. Assume
that Lo,k is very small keeping Lk,o constant and much
larger than Lo,k. In this case, the expression is dominated
by ξ(o, k) ≈ |Lk,o|
(∑M
l=1(Ll,k)
2
)1/2
which is predicted
well by Lk,o. Performing the same approximation for
small values of Lk,o keeping Lo,k constant and large, the
expression is well predicted by Lo,k. For this reason, we
need to keep both values in order to predict the overall
collective effects. On the other hand, one can easily check
that the approximation is equally valid if both LODFs are
of the same order.
Importantly, considering an arbitrary `p-norm instead,
the conclusions differ only slightly. An `p norm ‖x‖p of
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FIG. 8. (a) The predictor Λ(o, k) performs equally well predicting the collectivity parameter ξ for the test case ’pegase1354’ [38].
Predictor and collectivity parameter are plotted on a log-log-scale. (b) The remaining term does not show any visible correlation
with the collectivity parameter ξ. (c) The product of both terms exactly reproduces the collectivity parameter ξ as expected.
an arbitrary vector x ∈ RN is defined as
‖x‖p =
(
N∑
i=1
|xi|p
)1/p
.
For the predictor, we then have
ξp(o, k) = Λ(o, k)·
L(o, k)
(
M∑
l=1
∣∣∣∣∣Ll,o sign(Lo,k)
√
Lo,k
Lk,o
+ Ll,k
√
Lk,oLo,k
∣∣∣∣∣
p
+
∣∣∣∣∣Ll,k sign(Lk,o)
√
Lk,o
Lo,k
+ Ll,o
√
Lk,oLo,k
∣∣∣∣∣
p)1/p
.
Therefore, the general expression to be considered does
not change fundamentally when calculating the `p norm
instead.
Appendix C: Proof of proposition 1
Proof. The collectivity parameter defined by Eq. (12)
reads as
ξ(o, k) = L(o, k)
[ M∑
l=1
((Ll,o + Ll,kLk,o)Lo,k)
2
+
((Ll,k + Ll,oLo,k)Lk,o)
2
]1/2
.
We will demonstrate that ξ(o, k) is bounded from below
by Λ(o, k). First, since all addends in the sum are greater
than zero, neglecting any or all of them will not increase
the expression’s value. We can thus choose the addends
with l = o and l = k.
The expression then reads as
ξ(o, k) =L(o, k)
[ M∑
l=1
((Ll,o + Ll,kLk,o)Lo,k)
2
+
((Ll,k + Ll,oLo,k)Lk,o)
2
]1/2
≥ L(o, k)
[
((Lo,o + Lo,kLk,o)Lo,k)
2
+
((Lk,k + Lk,oLo,k)Lk,o)
2
]1/2 !≥ Λ(o, k)
Now we can make use of the fact that Lo,o = Lk,k = −1.
In order to show that this expression is bounded from be-
low by Λ(o, k), we can square both sides of the inequality
since all expressions considered here are positive. This
yields
ξ(o, k)2 ≥L(o, k)2
[
((Lo,kLk,o − 1)Lo,k)2 +
((Lk,oLo,k − 1)Lk,o)2
]
=L(o, k)2 1L(o, k)2
(
L2o,k + L
2
k,o
)
=
(
L2o,k + L
2
k,o
) ≥ Λ(o, k)2
The last inequality follows from the following considera-
tions
(Lo,k − Lk,o)2 + Lo,kLk,o > 0
⇔ L2o,k + L2k,o − Lo,kLk,o > 0
⇔ L2o,k + L2k,o > Lo,kLk,o = Λ(o, k)2,
which completes the proof. For Lo,k, Lk,o 6= 0, the in-
equality is strict.
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